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Consumer Tactics as 'Weapons'
Black lists, union labels, and the American Federation of Labor
Wendy A. Wiedenhoft
John Carroll University, USA

Abstract. This article examines the role consumer tactics played in the
American Federation of Labor’s (AFL) strategy of business unionism. In
particular, it explains how the AFL used its consumer tactics to try to mobilize
the purchasing power of union members and their families to fight for higher
wages and shorter working hours. The historical data collected for this article
demonstrates that the AFL was not ignorant of the relationship between
production and consumption, or the worker and the consumer. I discuss how
the AFL used its consumer tactics to try to build solidarity across its affiliated
trade unions and provide a way for the wives, daughters, and mothers of
union men to become involved in the labor movement through consumption.
I argue that these consumer tactics need to be fully acknowledged, as they
were pivotal in some of the most contentious struggles between the AFL and
business at the turn of the 20th century.
Key words
American standard of living ● history of consumption ● Progressive era ●
purchasing power ● trade unions ● working class

THE AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF LABOR’S (AFL) strategy of
business unionism has been singled out as a distinguishing factor
in the history of organized labor in the United States. Compared to
trade unions in Britain, Germany, and France, organized labor in
the United States turned away from achieving its goals, such as
higher wages and shorter working days, through political action in
the arena of the state (Hattam, 1993; Dubofsky, 1994; Mink, 1986;
Robertson, 2000). Constrained by the power of the state,
particularly the judiciary, as well as the power of employers, the AFL
adopted the position that ‘economic power [was] the basis upon
which may be developed power in other fields’ (Gompers, 1925: 286–
7). While the AFL did support protective labor legislation for females
and children and legislation to restrict Chinese immigration, it did
not consider legislation a legitimate route for elevating the
economic power of skilled, craft workers. This was particularly the
case during the formative years of the AFL, when the organization
was under the leadership of Samuel Gompers. Gomper’s advocacy
of ‘pure and simple’ business unionism located the struggle of
organized labor on the shop floor, decisively away from the
interference of the state.

Although much has been written regarding the various
tactics of business unionism, including collective bargaining and
strikes, the consumer tactics that the AFL created in promoting
business unionism have been neglected (exceptions include
Frank, 1994; Glickman, 1997). While the boycott is mentioned
generally as a tactic of business unionism, an elaboration of
precisely how it fitted into the AFL’s overall strategy is omitted. This
is particularly surprising considering the amount of attention that the
AFL devoted to promoting its two consumer boycott tactics, the ‘We
Don’t Patronize’ list and the union label, from the late 19th to early
20th centuries (Laidler, 1913; Spedden, 1910; Wolman, 1916).
The neglect of these consumer tactics is also interesting
considering that the AFL encountered two of its most problematic
conflicts with business and the judiciary regarding the publication
of its ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list. Glickman (1997) provides an
excellent account of how organized labor constructed a workingclass consciousness through the union label, particularly how
consumers were viewed as ‘employers’ when making purchasing
decisions and how the union label campaign brought women
consumers directly into the labor movement. However, Glickman
does not discuss in detail exactly how the union label fitted into
the AFL’s overall strategy of business unionism, especially how the
union label was implemented by the organization, nor does he
address the consumer tactic of the ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list. By
studying the union label and the ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list in tandem,
one can understand the important differences between the two
consumer tactics, especially how the latter contributed to the
animosity among the AFL, small businesses, and the judiciary.
There is little doubt that the strike was the primary labor
weapon of the AFL during this time period; however, boycotts were
used to support strikes and some members of the AFL suggested
that boycotts were ‘safer’ than strikes because workers could fight
for their demands without losing their paychecks. In this article I
explore the AFL’s understanding of the economic power of
consumers and explain how the ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list and the
union label fit into the ‘pure and simple’ ideology of the AFL. I
discuss why the AFL advocated consumer tactics in its struggle to
improve workplace issues, such as higher wages and shorter
working hours, as well as how it tried to mobilize its members
through these tactics. Finally, I demonstrate how business and the
state responded to the AFL’s consumer tactics, including one of the
AFL’s gravest defeats: becoming defined by the state as a ‘trust.’

THE ECONOMIC POWER OF THE CONSUMER
The ‘consumerist turn’ (Glickman, 1997) of the labor
movement during the Progressive era is hardly surprising
considering that Americans of this time period witnessed the rise
of mass consumption, from the introduction of cheap,
standardized goods to the creation of the modern department
store (Benson, 1986; Fox and Lears, 1983; Glickman, 1999;
Leach, 1993; McGovern, 1993; Strasser, 1989; Trachtenberg,
1980). Even the current marketing practice of targeting specific
consumer groups was established during this time when, Charles
McGovern (1993: 14) argues, advertisers changed their practices
from a ‘loosely placed “general publicity” on behalf of products’, to
the practice ‘of identifying markets for specific goods and creating
demand for them through means of public communications’.
Interestingly, not only did many of the means of consumption that
are now commonplace emerge during the Progressive era; so did
several of the theories of consumption that are debated today,
most notably Thorstein Veblen’s
theory
of
conspicuous
consumption (Horowitz, 1985). While Veblen overwhelmingly
viewed consumption as a social problem that encouraged
wasting money and time, other social economists of the time,
including George Gunton and Simon Patten, theorized that
consumption had the potential to promote the general welfare and
wealth of society by enhancing the moral character and living
standards of the working class.
This positive understanding of consumption as a means for
social change, particularly the economic power of the consumer to
use his or her purchasing power as a way to change unfair work
conditions or sway public policy, shaped consumer consciousness
during the Progressive era.1 ‘It was during the Progressive era,’ states
Hofstadter, ‘that the urban consumer first stepped forward as a
serious and self-conscious factor in American social politics’ (1955:
171). Cohen (2003) refers to this time period as the ‘first-wave
consumer movement’, and though her work primarily deals with
consumption from the Depression to the 1960s, the origins of
what she calls the ‘citizen consumer’ were clearly established during
the Progressive era. Citizen consumers, or consumers who ‘take
on the political responsibility we usually associate with citizens to
consider the general good of the nation through their consumption’
(Cohen, 2001: 204), aptly characterize middle- and upper-class

Progressive reform organizations, such as the National
Consumers’ League (NCL). While the NCL did employ consumer
tactics quite similar to the AFL, including a ‘white list’ and ‘white
label’, it eventually moved away from trying to mobilize the
economic power of consumers in the marketplace to mobilizing
the political power of consumers in the arena of the state (Sklar,
1998; Storrs, 2000).
The AFL embraced the Progressive understanding of the
economic power of the consumer and constructed a unique
working-class consumer consciousness around it. Although there is
little doubt that trade unionists of the AFL identified themselves as
workers first and consumers second, there was a concerted effort
during the Progressive era to get workers to realize that their
actions as consumers directly effected their employment
conditions.
According to Gompers:
the organized wage-worker moves by two cardinal, moral
principles. The first is his right, if he is a free man, to
dispose of his labor power as he wills. The second is his
right, if he is not a slave, to dispose of his purchasing
power as he chooses. (1920:
215)
Union workers and their families could use their economic power
as consumers to fight for shorter working hours and higher wages
through their wallets and pocketbooks. The interests of organized
labor were always at the forefront of the AFL’s understanding of
the economic power of consumption in contrast to the interests
of consumers. The consumer’s search for the greatest quantity of
goods at the lowest prices was antithetical to the AFL’s agenda.
Cheap goods were often produced by the unskilled labor of
children, women, and immigrants in sweatshops, which drove
down the wages of organized male workers. In the words of
one AFL member, ‘the principle that a dollar expended in the
maintenance of fair labor is worth more in the end than a dollar
saved at the bargain counter’ (Macarthur, 1904: 575).
The AFL recognized that the power of union consumers was
linked to its struggles for fair wages and an 8-hour workday. The AFL
reasoned that a worker’s income should depend upon his
expenditures – an inversion of the ‘hollow’ classical ‘iron law of
wages’. One article in the American Federationist made this relationship
between consumption and wages explicit:

What determines more potentially the consuming power
of the workers than the wages they receive in return for
labor performed? . . . The old theory that the selling price
of an article shall determine the wages paid to the
workman is hollow, shallow and unnatural. The order must
be reversed and the first consideration in the selling price
of an article must be a fair wage to labor. Wages must
dominate prices, not prices dominate wages. (Gompers,
1904: 41)
The AFL argued that manufacturers were neglecting to bring
consumption into the equation of production. On more than one
occasion, Gompers expressed the folly of businesses that increased
the prices of their products without increasing the wages of their
workers. This was not a solution to low profits because it hindered
the consuming power of the workers, resulting in glutted markets
and eventually ‘industrial stagnation’. Gompers captured the
irrationality of such practices in the annual AFL convention report
of 1893:
Production, production, production, faster, greater, was the
impulse, the thought and motive of the capitalist class.
That in the end the great body of workers comprise those
who must of necessity consume the production was given
no consideration whatever by our ‘Captains of Industry.’ As
a result, the great storehouses are glutted with the very
articles required by the people, without their ability – or
rather their opportunity – to consume them. (Gompers,
1920: 85)
The business focus on production at the expense of consumption
would never, according to the AFL, expand the material wealth of
the nation. In effect, it was retrogressive and blocked the
progress of civilization by stultifying the American standard of
living. After all, ‘if cheap labor meant progress, advancement, and
civilization, then China would today be at the head of the nations
of the world,’ claimed Gompers. An American workman could not
‘be expected to eat dogs and rats and live on rice . . . he wants a
better room and a better house’ (American Federationist, 1902:
709). Of course, to enjoy an American standard of living union
workers needed higher wages.
According to the AFL, a living wage was determined by one’s
standard of living, or the capacity of a worker to consume at the
social level of his peers. Thus, a living wage was not equivalent

to the concept of the minimum wage as understood by the
state. The AFL was critical of the budget studies conducted by
government agencies, particularly the various state bureaus of labor
statistics, because they did not take into account the standard of
living. Instead, most of these studies focused on the minimum
amount of income a worker needed to earn in order to support his
family at a nominal level of existence. For example, in 1894 the AFL
criticized a budget study by the Iowa Commission of Labor Statistics,
which concluded that a worker only needed to earn $12 per week,
or $624 per year, in order to support his family. After taking into
account the cost of basic necessities, which amounted to $567.84
annually, this left the family only $56.16 for other types of
expenditures to provide a comfortable standard of living. In a reply
to this study, one AFL member argued:
Is there any workingman amongst us who does not want
to see his family comfortable at least? Who would not like to
have carpets on the floors, curtains on the windows, or
pictures on the wall? No home should be without these,
or some of them, at least. Yet in the foregoing statistics
not one dollar has been allowed for anything of the sort.
(Weimer, 1894: 218–19)
The connection between wages and the standard of living was not
unique to the AFL’s philosophy. Social economists of the time also
acknowledged that the ‘desire for a higher standard of living
decides the minimum pay demanded by trade unions and
operates to increase earnings’ (Streightoff, 1910: 11). George
Gunton (1897) argued that employers who tried to reap higher
profits by keeping wages low and raising the prices of their goods
would suffer a loss in sales. Gunton proposed in a pamphlet that he
wrote for the AFL that ‘the standard of living is the economic law of
wages’ (Gunton, 1899: 11, emphasis in original). Like his mentor,
Ira Steward, Gunton believed that workers ‘would improve their
condition not by saving but by spending’ (Horowitz, 1985: 42). The
AFL did not expect that workers could immediately attain the
standard of living of middle- or upper-class families, but it did believe
that workers could cultivate their tastes and increase their wants if
they worked fewer hours. Thus, leisure was a key variable in raising a
worker’s standard of living, which in turn would increase his wages.
The AFL’s fight for a living wage was intricately linked to its fight
for an eight-hour workday. Ira Steward was one of the first labor
advocates to propose that the solution to low wages was a shorter
workday. In his essay ‘A Reduction of Hours, an Increase in Wages’,

published in 1865, Steward argued that ‘more leisure will create
motives and temptations for the most ordinary laborer to insist upon
higher wages’ (Glickman, 1997: 102–3). The advancement of labor
in America rested upon its ability to consume, and the purchasing
power of labor depended upon more leisure. Gunton
suggested that leisure was the basis of expanding the social
opportunities of the working class because it would allow the worker
to enlarge his ‘field of experience by making more frequent and
varied social intercourse’. This increased exposure to ‘new and
more complex social relations’, claimed Gunton, would ‘awaken
and develop new tastes and desires for more social comforts’.
Observing how the middle and upper classes live, the working class
‘would naturally begin to desire more wholesome and better
appointed homes, more literature, [and] entertainment’ (Gunton,
1899: 12–14). Gompers seemed to fully support the beliefs of
Steward and Gunton, claiming that:
increased leisure brings forth a desire, a taste, a demand
for a book, a paper, a magazine, either of which creates a
further demand . . . leisure forces the worker’s attention to
the clothing of his wife and children, it compels the worker
to be in the streets at the time when people are best
dressed, he and his must be clad near an approach to the
average or be regarded as social inferiors. (1897: 24)
It was evident to the AFL that the state was going to secure neither
shorter working days for male workers nor a living wage.
Therefore, the AFL struggled for these labor rights on the shop
floor using the tactic of the strike and at the store counter using
the tactic of the boycott.
LISTS AND LABELS: BOYCOTTS AND BUSINESS UNIONISM
The boycott occupies not simply an important site of the
struggle for organized labor in the USA; it also provides a provocative
point from which to study the relationship between production and
consumption, workers and consumers. The AFL understood this
relationship, recognizing that workers could use their purchasing
power as consumers to help improve their working conditions on
the shop floor. In other words, the AFL constructed that act of
consumption as more than, in the words of Adam Smith, ‘the end
of production’, but as a means to change production (Smith, 1937).
Workers could use consumption as a means to change production
by either withholding their purchasing power from firms that
discriminated against organized labor or directing their purchasing

power toward firms that met the demands of organized labor.
The AFL devised tactics to capture both of these forms of
consumption: the ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list to withhold union
patronage and the union label to encourage the purchasing of
union-made products.
The ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list was first published in 1894 in the
AFL’s monthly journal, the American Federationist (AF). The list was a
register of manufacturers who refused to implement AFL wage and
hours standards and openly discriminated against union labor.
Union workers were striking at many of the firms that were on
the list, which turned the list into an economic weapon to
strengthen the power of the strike (Burnett, 1891: 172; Wolman,
1916: 22). Retail establishments and firms that conducted
business with manufacturers unfair to union labor were also
placed on the list. This practice turned the ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list
into a ‘secondary’ boycott, intended to ‘induce or persuade third
parties to cease business relations with those against whom there
is a grievance’ (Laidler, 1913: 64).
The ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list was considered a ‘positive’ boycott
as it was meant to prohibit workers from purchasing goods from
the firms on it, similar to the black lists used by employers to
discriminate against union workers (Laidler, 1913: 60). Although it
was classified as a positive boycott, the list carried the negative
connotations of the employers’ black lists. The refusal to buy
products manufactured by firms unfair to union labor was viewed
just as destructive as the refusal of employers to hire union workers.
Indeed, the practice of boycotting during the Gilded Age and
Progressive era was generally viewed as a tool of coercion or
intimidation by ‘combinations’ or trusts, whether they be initiated by
organized labor or employers (Burnett, 1891: 164; Laidler, 1913:
17; Wolman, 1916: 11). The AFL attempted to minimize the
adverse associations identified with the boycott by taking strict
precautions that no firm was placed on the ‘We Don’t Patronize’
list unfairly. Speaking at the 1897 annual convention, Gompers
stated that ‘in no case has a concern been placed upon the “We
Don’t Patronize” list until it has had the opportunity to be heard
in its own defense’ (Gompers, 1920). However, so many firms were
being placed on the list every month that the AFL decided at its
convention in 1900 to drop all firms from the list, claiming that the
sheer number of firms was bringing the list ‘into a state of
impotency’ (American Federationist, 1901: 166).

The AFL did not discontinue its ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list and
allowed its affiliated trade unions to request renewals of firms
that they were boycotting. This was primarily an attempt by the
AFL to coordinate, thus exert more control over, local boycotts. It
was also a way to legitimize the list as a more judicious tactic. The
AFL began to require its affiliates to first try to settle its disputes
with firms privately, and more amicably. For example, the AFL
stated that ‘in our judgement questions of this character can and
should be more justly discussed through correspondence than to
air such matters through the press, even though they be our official
publications’ (Lorwin, 1933: 48). Before a requested firm was placed
on the ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list, the AFL required that trade unions
provide the Executive Council with a full statement of its
grievances against the firm and explain what efforts had been made
to resolve these grievances. The Executive Council then decided if
the trade union had acted in good faith and made ‘every effort to
amicably adjust the matter’ with the firm in question. If this was
found to be the case, the Executive Council approved the firm to
be placed on the list (American Federationist, 1904: 161). Trade
unions with firms on the list were required to report on the efforts
being made to resolve the grievances that had led to the boycott
every three months; failure to do so resulted in the firm being
dropped from the list (American Federationist, 1907a: 352). Along with
these stricter criteria, the AFL decided to limit the number of firms
that individual trade unions could place on the list at any given
time. International unions were limited to three listings and local
unions to only one. Not surprisingly, these stricter regulations
decreased the number of boycotts approved by the AFL every year.
While 81 boycotts were endorsed between 1902–3, only 21 were
approved from 1905–6. However, the number of firms on the list
did increase after 1906 at the height of the AFL’s struggle with
business and the state over the legality of this tactic (Laidler, 1913:
112–13).
The union label escaped many of the negative connotations
associated with the ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list because it was
considered a ‘negative’ or ‘indirect’ boycott (Laidler, 1913: 60;
Wolman, 1916: 14). Rather than asking workers to withhold their
patronage from firms, it is recommended that they buy products
made with union labor. While the ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list was
viewed as destructive, the union label was considered constructive.
As one commentator wrote in the North American Review, ‘the label
builds up the fair employer’s trade instead of tearing down the
unfair man’s business, as did the boycott. The union label is

constructive, not destructive’ (Kelly, 1897: 36). A leaflet published by
the Social Reform Club of New York praised the union label as
a tool of progress, claiming that ‘the label has resulted from that
steady constructive effort toward improvement which is carried on
by wage earners’ and that ‘it has great interest for everyone who
loves fair play, self-help, and equal chances for all’ (Brooks, 1898:
207).2
Interestingly, the origins of the union label were not quite so
constructive. The first label was issued in 1875 by the Cigar Makers’
Association of the Pacific Coast in an attempt to protect skilled craft
jobs from unskilled Chinese competition. Threatened by the low
wages and low standard of living acceptable to Chinese workers,
the Association used racist, anti- immigration sentiments to appeal
to white cigar consumers. This first label, which was white in color,
was pasted upon cigar boxes that contained union-made cigars. It
stated that ‘the cigars contained in this box are made by WHITE
MEN’ and it was only issued to manufacturers who employed white
cigar makers. The Association continued to use this white union label
until it was replaced by the Cigar Makers’ International Union
(CMIU) label in 1884. Anti-immigration sentiments continued to be
used to appeal to white consumers with the CMIU label,
although the connection to immigrant labor was more directly
connected to the quality of workman- ship and cleanliness of
working conditions. The CMIU label stated that cigars ‘had been
made by a first class workman, a member of the Cigar Makers’
International Union of America, an organization opposed to
inferior rat shop, coolie, prison, or filthy tenement-house
workmanship’ (Spedden, 1910: 10–15). While the issue of an
American standard of living for union workers was certainly
represented in this label – CMUI members would not find it
acceptable to live in ‘filthy’ tenement houses – the focus on quality
and cleanliness of cigars signaled a recognition that the interests of
consumers were also important. If union demands or antiimmigration sentiments would not appeal to consumers,
perhaps the safety of the products they consumed would.
According to Spedden, from 1880 to 1890 the union label was used
‘not as a means of appeal to unionists to support other unionists,
but as a means of appeal to the public against conditions that
were generally discountenanced – tenement-houses, sweat-shop,
and prison labor’ (Spedden, 1910: 17).
Maintaining its position on trade union autonomy, the AFL
allowed each of its affiliates to design its own unique union label.

Thus, union labels differed in shape, size, color, and even texture;
some union labels were stamped, others engraved or sewn onto
products. In 1895 the AFL prepared a bill for a uniform label and
also resolved to investigate the matter of creating a universal label
at its 1899 convention, but the Executive Council decided against
enforcing a universal label on its affiliates. Therefore, at any given
time there existed a large variety of union labels being used
across the country, resulting both in difficulty of obtaining
trademarks to protect each label and counterfeiting. The AFL was
successful at obtaining trade- marks for many union labels at the
state level, which meant that trade unions could sue
manufacturers and merchants who used or sold counterfeit labels.
This success of procuring trademarks for union labels was
significant because it forced states to recognize trade unions as legal
entities. According to Willard,‘in granting protection to union labels
of associations of workingmen, the different states have recognized
their right of property. . . and in doing so have legalized the status of
such associations or combinations’ (Willard, 1895: 157–8).
Surprisingly, this was one judiciary issue where the AFL did not
face immediate hostility. In fact, trade unions encountered an
easier time in court than manufacturers did in terms of protecting
trademarks. While ‘manufacturers had a long fight before they
could induce the courts to recognize their right to a trademark’ the
‘very first attempt on the part of the workmen to get that protection
was granted’ (Cohen, 1900: 377).
By the mid-1890s, the AFL started to employ the union label as a
means to organize non-union workers and to direct union-earned
dollars toward union-labeled products. The AFL touted the union
label as the ‘one practical means of universal self-protection [on]
which workers can unite’ (American Federationist, 1895: 9). Gompers
claimed at the 1899 convention that:
the union label has not only been the means of organizing
large numbers of non-unionists, but better than all, it has
stimulated and strengthened unity and fraternity among
the organized workers of the different trades and callings.
(Gompers, 1920: 177)
While consumers sympathetic to the union cause, like members
of the NCL, were welcome to purchase union-labeled goods (see
Gompers 1896: 144), the AFL simply did not have the resources to
recruit actively middle- and upper-class consumers. The AFL
reasoned that these consumers were not driven by the ‘desire for
cheapness’ because they understood that cheap goods were often

produced by child labor, exploited female workers or in unclean
sweatshops (Hall, 1905: 71–2). Even Brooks recognized that
reform-minded consumers would not be likely to purchase the
working- class goods that displayed the union label (Brooks,
1898, 1899). John Morrison, a consultant for the AFL’s Union Label
Committee contacted in 1908 on how to advertise the label better,
expressed this point. Morrison claimed that ‘no matter how much
you advertise to appeal to the general public, who are not in any
way connected with the labor movement, they will not ask for the
label’ (1908: 630). Thus, the AFL did not need to waste its time and
energy enlisting their purchasing power to support union- labeled
goods. Instead, it could concentrate on mobilizing its current and
potential members. ‘It is to this desire,’ according to John Mitchell,
President of the United Mine Workers of America, ‘to enlist the
workingman as a consumer in support for his demand as a
producer that we owe the union label’ (Mitchell, 1903: 293).
While the AFL used the union label to identify its members as
both workers and consumers, it also used this tactic to mobilize the
purchasing power of the wives, daughters, sisters, and mothers of
union workers. It became increasingly evident that the strength of
the union label rested upon the cooperation of these women,
who spent ‘union dollars’ to maintain working-class households.
The AFL passed a resolution at its 1896 convention, stating that it
was its members’ ‘duty to see that their wives and families patronized
union products’. The Woman Union Label League (WULL) was
established in 1899 as an educational organization to inform union
wives and families on what kinds of products were made by the
different trade unions. It also instructed them on what various union
labels looked like and where they were located on different
types of goods. WULL was promoted as a means to get union
wives to understand that shopping was a collective, rather than
individual, practice as these women could ‘ill afford to consider
individual economy or individual convenience when spending the
money earned by union men’ (Williamson, 1906: 171). Through
participating in WULL, union wives could finally ‘feel a corporate
interest in the labor movement as a whole’ and ‘become conscious
of their power as women and their influence as members of an
organization’. According to Mamie Brettell, President and General
Organizer of WULL, it was critical that union wives become
‘enlisted in the settlement of the burning questions of our times,
with which men have been struggling against fearful odds, too
often without sympathy in the home’ (Brettell, 1905: 276). The
AFL viewed the high morals of womankind as a powerful force to

mobilize in its struggle for social justice, particularly as a way to
promote the constructive attributes of the union label. According
to one union member, the union label was ‘peculiarly adapted to the
nature of that factor which typifies the highest morality and
controls the purchasing power of every community, to wit, the
mistress of the household’ (Macarthur, 1904: 575). Enlisting
women as union-spenders could reveal the humanity of the labor
movement, even though it did, as Glickman (1997: 109) correctly
points out, place a large burden on working-class women to
manage the household budget efficiently and to conscientiously buy
union labeled goods.
The AFL advocated its union label to union members and their
families as a potential substitute for the strike. The numerous
injunctions that the AFL encountered made the strike a costly tactic
both in terms of securing money for workers on strike and legal
fees for fighting these injunctions in court. The low job security
associated with the strike made it a sacrifice that many AFL members
did not eagerly embrace. The union label was viewed as a powerful
weapon that trade unionists could use to fight employers in the
economic realm, while keeping their jobs and avoiding court
injunctions. One AFL member claimed that ‘the union label is
powerful because it accomplishes by peaceful means, with
absolute certainty and little cost, that which the strike and boycott
seek to accomplish, always at great cost and sacrifice and often
without apparent results’ (Macarthur, 1904: 573). This view of the
union label was shared by another AFL member, who argued that:
the battles of the label are won without blood. It is more
powerful than strikes and picketing; and its potency as a
warning to tyrannical employers surpasses a union treasury
congested with surplus funds . . . No injunctions can reach
it, no militia of Pinkertons dare touch it, no pen will revile it,
no pulpit assail it. (Shevlin, 1904: 577)
Local trade unionists of the Denver Union Label League (DULL)
also viewed the union label as safer and more economical than
strikes. ‘While the striker’s place may be filled,’ argued one DULL
member, ‘there is no substitute for the label’ (Denver Union Label
League, 1906).
BUSINESSES ORGANIZE TO FIGHT CONSUMER TACTICS
The tactics that the AFL employed to mobilize consumers did
not go unnoticed by business or the state. Indeed, contentious

relationships developed between these actors over the ways in
which the AFL employed its consumer tactics. Although these
relationships did not turn into violent conflicts, they did involve
power struggles over the control of production and consumption.
Manufacturers attacked the AFL on the publication of its ‘We Don’t
Patronize’ list, claiming that this tactic was coercive and interfered
with their individual rights to produce and sell goods. They
organized their own associations to try to combat this boycott tactic.
The battles between business and the AFL would be resolved, not
in the marketplace, but in the arena of the judiciary. For the AFL,
the unfortunate result of this struggle was that its ‘We Don’t Patronize’
list was declared unconstitutional. The AFL was forced to give up
this consumer tactic and as a result made the decision to
concentrate its consumer mobilizing efforts on its remaining tactic,
the union label.
Business responded to the AFL’s boycott tactics by
organizing into associations (see Forbath, 1999). One of the first
examples of this occurred in 1886 when the Brewers’ Association
agreed that if one of its members was subjected to a labor boycott,
they would all cease selling their products. This would leave
consumers without any substitute for beer on the market, which
they hoped would force consumers to stand up against any beer
boycott and shape consumer opinion against organized labor
(Wolman, 1916: 39). The National Association of Manufacturers
(NAM) was organized in 1895 to promote free trade, but as
Gompers stated, ‘starting in 1902 [it] began its campaign to deprive
organized labor of its primary rights – the right to work or withhold
their labor power . . . and the right to buy from whom they choose’
(Gompers, 1920: 50). Another business organization, the American
Anti-Boycott Association (AABA), was formed in 1902 as a direct result
of the AFL success at mobilizing union purchasing power through
its ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list. NAM and the AABA controlled
significant resources, not just in terms of money, but in terms of
power through political alliances. Members of both organizations
used these resources to take the AFL to court over boycotts that
were destroying their businesses.
Stereotypes invoked to describe manufacturers during the
Progressive era are often ‘big business’, ‘monopolies’, or ‘trusts’,
but small and mid- sized firms also existed, struggling to survive
in the marketplace. These ‘proprietary capitalists’ (Ernst, 1989)
were untouched by the managerial revolution and were victims
of big business, organized labor, and state regulations. Big

business could afford to obey government regulations and
possessed the capital to either fight with, or concede to, the
demands of organized labor. Small and mid-sized firms lacked
the finances to do either, and the competition from big business
often drove them into bankruptcy. These proprietary capitalists
best characterized the majority of AABA members. Most, if not all
AABA members, were particularly hostile to the AFL; they refused
to unionize their shops because it meant they would be forced to
surrender their ‘right of managerial authority’ to their employees
(Ernst, 1989: 138). This refusal to recognize the right of
workers to unionize made the businesses of AABA members
particularly vulnerable to attacks from the AFL, who fought the
AABA through its ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list.
Interestingly, both the AABA and the AFL used a similar
discourse of ‘freedom’ and ‘individual rights’ to support their respective
positions on the boycott issue. According to the platform of the
AABA:
The boycott must be regarded as that un-American and
reprehensible practice of organized labor whereby the
products of a given manufacturer or any individual are
held up to denunciation, contempt, and proscription
under a spirit of blackmail . . . Such a practice is foreign to
principles of fair dealing and equity which we love to
regard as the spirit of our nation. (Wolman, 1916: 40)
While the AABA promoted the individual rights of employers to
conduct business freely, without interference from labor, the AFL
paralleled this ideology through promoting the individual rights of
employees to spend their money freely. Gompers declared in his
1893 testimony before the Industrial Commission that:
men have a right to do business, but this is one-half of the
truth. The men with whom business is done have the right
to withdraw and transfer their custom. This is the other half,
which is always ignored in anti-boycott arguments . . .
workmen have a right to say that they will not patronize
those who are unfriendly to them and those who support
their adversaries. (Gompers, 1920: 209)
The AFL challenged the AABA’s position that boycotting was a
‘foreign’ practice, or ‘un-American’. Gompers claimed that the
boycott was the quintessential American tactic to fight for
freedom, and compared the AFL’s use of the boycott to the
colonial nonimportation
movement during the American

Revolution of boycotting British products. Gompers argued that ‘all
students of American history know that the Boston “tea party”
was an American boycott against British merchants and British
government’ (Gompers, 1907c: 875–80). He also suggested that
citizens refer to a recent book by Woodrow Wilson called History of
the American People that discussed the patriotic impulse of the
nonimportation movement, and then ‘let each ask himself whether
labor’s boycott of to- day is unpatriotic, un-American.’
As much as the AABA asserted its members’ rights to freely
conduct trade and control the workforce, it eventually had to seek
recourse against AFL boycotts in the state arena. Considering the
AABA’s ideology, the turn to state intervention was uncharacteristic
of small business at the time. While many monopoly enterprises
supported state regulations because they could afford to implement
safety standards and economically benefited from the state incurring
the responsibility of protecting consumers, small businesses with
local markets suffered. Federally mandated trade regulations did not
apply to intra-state commerce, only to interstate trade. Thus, only
small and mid-sized firms that were able to build a nationwide
market for their products could use federal trade regulations to their
advantage. Interstate commerce laws were particularly significant
when one AABA member, Dietrich Loewe, commenced an
attack against the AFL’s ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list. This was because
the list was disseminated nationally and, therefore, constituted a
nationwide boycott.
Loewe, a co-founder of the AABA and owner of a hat
factory in Danbury, CT, prepared a case that tested the legality of
the AFL’s ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list after the United Hatters of America
(UHA), an AFL affiliate, decided to issue a boycott against his
products. The boycott was a result of Loewe’s refusal to unionize his
factories, or operate a ‘closed shop’. Wages were also an issue as
the UHA claimed that workers earned almost twice as much in
closed shops ($22–$24 per week for an 8-hour day) compared to
$13 per day for 12–15-hour days in open, or non-union shops. The
UHA presented the reasons for its boycott to the Executive Council
of the AFL, which approved the boycott and published Loewe’s firm
on its ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list. While this action would have probably
been enough to incite Loewe, the fact that the AFL also asked
retailers to participate in this boycott constituted nothing less than
‘blackmail’ to the AABA. Involving retailers meant that the AFL was
not only conducting a primary boycott in which its own members
were requested to withhold their patronage, but also a secondary

boycott in which individuals outside of the labor movement were
asked, or in some cases prevented, from purchasing Loewe’s
products. The secondary boycott against Loewe was indeed
coercive. A shipping clerk at Loewe’s factory was employed by the
AFL to report the locations of where Loewe’s goods were being
shipped and to what retailers. The AFL used this information to
persuade personally these retailers not to conduct business with
Loewe (Laidler, 1913: 152; Robertson, 2000: 112).
The AFL’s ability to mobilize the purchasing power of its members
was successful and the boycott on Loewe proved quite effective.
Before the boycott was issued in 1901, Loewe’s net profits were
reported to be $27,000; his profits decreased to $17,000 only one
year after the boycott, and fell to $15,000 as the boycott continued
into 1903. When Loewe finally filed a lawsuit against the UHA on 31
August 1903, he claimed his company had suffered a net loss of
$88,000 due to the boycott (Laidler, 1913: 152–3). Loewe argued in
his lawsuit that the UHA boycott violated the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act of 1890, which deemed business practices that interfered with
interstate trade illegal. The Sherman Act was initially passed to
protect consumers from price-fixing and other coercive practices
of monopoly industries. In fact, under the Sherman Act, business
combinations or trusts were considered illegal associations.
According to Senator John Sherman:
the object of this bill . . . is to declare unlawful trusts and
combinations in restraint of trade and production . . . This
bill does not seek to cripple combinations of capital and
labor, the formation of partnerships or of corporations, but
only to prevent and control combinations made with a
view to prevent competition, or for the restraint of trade,
or to increase the profits of the producer at the cost of
the consumer. (Kolko,
1963: 61–2)
The Sherman Act was rarely applied in practice towards
business. In fact, it ‘posed an incomparably greater threat to labor
than capital’ because the federal government had to bring suits
against capital in order to enforce the Sherman Act, but capital or
business could bring suits against labor ‘without any government
action at all’ (Sklar, 1988: 224–5). While many people understood
the AFL as a labor monopoly or trust, it was not until Loewe filed
his lawsuit that the state began to consider the AFL a combination.
According to Gompers, this was a ridiculous stretch of the

imagination because a trust, by definition, had to monopolize
and control the production and distribution of a material product.
Labor was not a material commodity, therefore the AFL should not
have been considered a trust because ‘there can not be a trust in
something which is not yet produced’ (Gompers, 1908b). Thus, in
order for Loewe to win his case he had to first prove to the court
that the AFL was a trust, and hence subject to the terms of the
Sherman Act.
The stakes in this case, known as Loewe v. Lawler or the
Danbury Hatters’ Case, were high for the AFL. If Loewe, with the
backing of the AABA, could convince the court that the AFL was a
trust and subject to the Sherman Act, it would mean more than the
prohibition of its boycott tactic; it would ultimately rule the AFL an
illegal organization. In effect, it would mean that under the court of
law the AFL was a combination no different than for-profit business
monopolies like Standard Oil. Further- more, a winning decision
for Loewe could financially damage the AFL because under
Section 7 of the Sherman Act, Loewe was entitled to collect three
times the amount of profits he lost due to the boycott as well as the
cost of his attorney fees (Gompers, 1908b: 181; Laidler, 1913: 153–
4).
Due to a number of delays, Loewe v. Lawlor was not heard
before the Supreme Court of the United States until 13 October
1909. Between the years of 1903 and 1909, Loewe claimed that
he had lost approximately $74,000 in profits from the continued AFL
boycott. This meant that including his attorney fees he was entitled
to collect $232,240 when the Supreme Court ruled in his favor.
The decision by the Supreme Court in this case was unanimous –
the AFL constituted a trust and its boycott against Loewe was illegal
under the Sherman Act. According to this ruling, the AFL was not
only prohibited from boycotting products, but also from striking,
signing union contracts and, ultimately, from existing at all (Sklar,
1998: 223–4). Perhaps the most significant implication of this court
decision was that labor was now understood as a commodity by the
state.
The AFL would have to wait until the Clayton Act was passed in
1914 to gain exemption from the Sherman Act. From the AFL’s
perspective the Clayton Act was hailed to be its ‘magna charta’, as it
asserted that labor was, in fact, not a commodity (see Gompers,
1925: 284–99; Robertson, 2000: 191–4). Daniel Davenport, the
General Counsel of the AABA, stated that the Clayton Act ‘makes

few changes in the existing laws relating to labor unions . . . and
those are of slight practical importance’ (Wolman, 1916: 9). The
AABA assisted in shaping the language of the Clayton Act, and
even though the AFL claimed it to be a great victory for organized
labor, it still did not overturn Loewe v. Lawlor. The AFL was still
prohibited from organizing nationwide boycotts.
NAM also challenged the AFL over the legality of its boycott
practices, including the publication of its ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list.
NAM made no secret about its hostility toward organized labor, and
in 1907 began a 3-year fundraising campaign to raise $500,000
annually in its fight against unions. Weary of the financial power of
NAM, the AFL referred to this money as a ‘war fund’ (Gompers,
1907b: 785). One of the most trenchant battles in the ‘war’ between
NAM and the AFL arose when James Van Cleave, owner of the
Buck Stove and Range Company and the President of NAM,
refused to recognize union workers’ demand for a shorter
workday. The AFL responded by issuing a boycott against Van
Cleave’s products and placing the Buck Stove and Range Company
on its ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list.Van Cleave, with the organizational and
financial backing of NAM, filed an injunction against the AFL for
these actions. Justice Ashley Gould of the Supreme Court in the
District of Columbia, granted the injunction on 18 December
1907. This injunction made it illegal for the AFL to declare ‘or
threaten any boycott against the compliant’ or ‘distribute through the
mail, or in any other manner any copies . . . which . . . refer to the
name of the compliant, its business, or its product in the “We Don’t
Patronize”, or the “Unfair” list of the defendants’ (Gould, 1908: 114).
Refusal to abide by this injunction would be punishable by fines
and prison time.
Gould’s issuance of this injunction set off a series of tirades by
the AFL against the judiciary system, NAM, and Van Cleave. According
to the AFL, this injunction was by far the most damaging attack
that it had encountered because it infringed upon two
‘fundamental liberties’: the freedom of speech and the freedom of
the press (Gompers, 1908a: 98). Not only was the AFL silenced
from ‘declaring’ boycotts, it was also without voice in the form of
printing a boycott through its ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list. Van Cleave
claimed that the AFL was coercing its members to withdraw their
patronage from his products, which the AFL denied. According to
Gompers:
the members of organized labor are themselves not obliged

to refrain from dealing with the firms on the ‘We Don’t
Patronize’ list . . . the information is given them. There is
no compulsion. They are entirely free to use their own
judgement. (1908a: 102)
The AFL further denied that it had unfairly interfered with Van
Cleave’s business, as Justice Gould assumed. The AFL informed its
members that Van Cleave was hostile to organized labor by
refusing to recognize union hours and wages – a fact that Van
Cleave was proud to admit. Gompers wondered why, then, Van
Cleave was so opposed to his company appearing on the AFL’s
‘We Don’t Patronize’ list –
if Mr. Van Cleave’s opposition to the union shop is a
matter of honest and conscientious conviction we should
think he would writhe in pain under an injunction which
prevents the publication of the fact. (Gompers, 1908a:
101)
Indeed, if firms opposed to organized labor truly believed that the
consuming public was behind their position, they should take pride
when the AFL acknowledged them on its ‘We Don’t Patronize’
list – it was the ‘best possible advertisement’(Gompers, 1908a:
100).
The AFL argued that what was truly coercive was the
injunction granted to Van Cleave, not its own boycott tactic.
Individuals should be free to exercise the right to buy or not to buy,
avowed Gompers and ‘no manufacturer, no retailer, has any vested
right in the purchasing power of an individual or of the community,
no court can confer upon him that right’ (Gompers, 1908a: 103).
Before Van Cleave was granted his injunction, the AFL printed the
following:
Until a law is passed making it compulsory upon labor
men to buy Van Cleave’s stoves we need not buy them,
we won’t buy them, and we will persuade other fairminded, sympathetic friends to co-operate with us and
leave the blamed things alone. ‘Go to – with your
injunctions.’ (American Federationist, 1907b: 792)
Furthermore, the AFL argued that Van Cleave, and other
manufacturers who claimed that union boycotts restricted free
trade should be mindful of their hypocrisy of using state
injunctions to protect their products – a practice that indeed
interfered with interstate commerce. In other words, it was

business that infringed upon the rights of purchasers, not the
union.
The Buck Stove and Range Case injunction coincided with the
ruling in the Hatters’ case on 3 February 1908, at which time the
AFL decided to discontinue its ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list. Gompers
regretfully informed all affiliated unions that since the AFL was now
subject to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, thus liable for monetary
fines and imprisonment, continuing the list was simply too perilous.
He cautioned against individual trade unions publishing any boycott
announcements, as ‘personal willingness to bear penalty would avail
to nothing in this instance to spare the other men of labor and our
organization from the penalties decreed to them by the Supreme
Court’ (American Federationist, 1908: 195). While Gompers stated
that the AFL had to obey the court’s decision, he admitted that he felt
‘most deeply that never in the history of our country has there
been so serious an invasion of the rights and liberties of our people’
(American Federationist, 1908: 195).
Considering the numerous injunctions that the AFL had faced
in the past regarding the right to strike, it is important to note that it
was actually the right to purchase or consume that came to
define one of the most contentious relationships between
organized labor, business, and the state at this point in history.
Although the AFL was forced to relinquish the publication of its ‘We
Don’t Patronize’ list, this action did not impede the AFL’s effort to
mobilize consumers with its union label tactic. Unlike the ‘We
Don’t Patronize’ list, the union label was not considered a boycott
by the state because it recommended, rather than prohibited,
products for consumers to purchase. Thus, the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act did not apply to the union label because it did not interfere
with interstate trade in a negative manner.
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Loewe v. Lawlor and
Justice Gould’s injunction in the Buck Stove and Range case, the
AFL decided to strengthen its efforts to promote the union label as
a mobilizing tactic. In response to the outcome of the Loewe case,
James Lynch, President of the International Typographical Union,
asked:
Does not this decision bring clearly to the front the value
of the union label? Should it not impress on the organized
workingmen of the country that through the label they
have a weapon for use against their enemies and
oppressors that can not be touched by lawyers or courts?

. . . I do advise that redoubled effort should be put forth
for the patronage of union-labeled products. (Lynch,
1908: 166)
Thus, rather than relinquish its efforts to mobilize consumers at the
point of purchase after the loss of its ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list, the
Executive Council decided to establish a Union Label Department
in 1908 to more effectively mobilize the purchasing power of its
constituency through the union label. By 1908, 68 of the 117
national trade unions affiliated with the AFL were using a union
label, about 47 percent of the aggregate membership of the
AFL (Spedden, 1910: 22).
CONCLUSION
The AFL continued its union label campaign into the 1920s,
but by the 1930s it was no longer an important component of its
strategy of business unionism. As Glickman (1997: 128) rightly
points out, by the 1930s there was a general cultural shift away
from ‘consumerism as activism’ toward ‘consumerism as public
policy’. The
beginnings of
the ‘second-wave consumer
movement’ (Cohen, 2003), coordinated by business and the
federal government to enact consumer safety and protection
policies, was already underway during the later years of the
Progressive era. The work of the NCL provides a telling example
of this transition from the first to the second wave of
consumerism. The central activity of city and state consumers’
leagues, organized into the NCL in 1899, was the construction of
white lists and labels. However, the importance of these consumer
tactics began to fade when the NCL began work to help get the
Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 passed and secure a labor law
to limit the hours for female workers in the case of Muller v. Oregon
in 1908 (Dirks, 1996; Storrs, 2000). The commitment of the NCL
to public policy over its consumer tactics is best captured in its
decision to end its white label campaign in 1918. According to
NCL documents, it was becoming increasingly difficult to ensure
that manufacturers who were awarded the label were meeting its
labor standards. When the AFL initiated a strike against a Boston
manufacturer who was awarded the NCL label, it became evident
to the NCL that consumer tactics would be best left in the hands
of organized labor and that labor laws, not individual consumers,
could best regulate working conditions (NCL, 1918a, 1918b). The
economic
power
of
the
consumer
at

the point of purchase gradually gave way to the political power of
the consumer as a citizen.
The AFL did adhere to its ideology of the economic power of
the consumer longer than Progressive reform organizations like the
NCL. One may surmise that this was partly a reflection of the
AFL’s distrust of the state and its reluctance during the time to
engage in political action. However, it was also a reflection of the
failure of the state to fully recognize the significance of
consumption in terms other than consumer protection and safety. As
Glickman (1997: 155) and Cohen (2003: 20) emphasize, this
changed during the New Deal, when the state began to view
consumption as a means to bring the nation out of the Great
Depression. The purchasing power of the consumer became a
central component of public policy during the 1930s, co-opting
much of the activism that informed the working-class consumer
consciousness of the Progressive era. However, as recent studies
(Cohen, 2003; Frank, 1999; Friedman, 1999; Glickman, 2001, 2004)
demonstrate, consumer activism in the USA did not entirely disappear after the New Deal. From the bus boycotts during the Civil
Rights era to current environmental boycotts against eating
Chilean sea bass, consumers have continued to exercise their
economic power to try to change society.
Notes
1. It is important to note that ‘American consumer activism’ existed prior
to the
Progressive era (see Breen, 2004; Frank, 1999; Glickman, 2004).
2. Brooks became the President of the NCL when it was established in
1899. The League created its own label, which was placed on white
goods produced under fair working conditions. For more on the League
see Sklar (1998). The constructive nature of the union label was not
shared by all; see Nichols (1897).
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